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The title of The Battle for International Law evokes Rudolf von Jhering’s (“The
Struggle / Battle for Law”). In this work, Jhering describes law as the product of
struggle between conflicting interests and therefore as fundamentally enmeshed
with politics. On the European continent, international lawyers generally see the
idea of systematicity, especially in its Kelsenian variant, as being fundamentally
opposed to Jhering’s conception of law. Mónica García-Salmones Rovira has shown
masterfully that the aim of producing a science of law purged from morality and
politics, despite rejecting the ‘political’ struggle of interests as part of legal science,
paved the way for a particular political project with its own idea of a struggle of
interests. This particular project included a movement from morality to economy and
therefore to another vocabulary of necessity and incontestability. As Jochen von
Bernstorff and Philipp Dann state in the Introduction, the volume at hand sets out to
offer “new historical insights into the conditions, contingencies, and necessities of
what led to [the world’s] current depressing and desolate state”. Legal and economic
vocabularies working together to make the neoliberal model of world order seem
inescapable certainly play a role in providing answers to this question. The idea of
international law as a coherent legal system deserves more attention as part of these
vocabularies.
One of the themes of the volume at hand consists in tracing how “the inherent
conservative bias of law as ingrained social practice was used by Western actors
to counter requested revolutionary innovations as incompatible with the ‘system’ or
internal ‘coherence’ of a specific notion of ‘international law’” (p. 5–6). However, the
volume does not dedicate a separate chapter to the notions of ‘system’, ‘coherence’,
or ‘order’ as conceptual weapons (‘Kampfbegriffe’, as the subtitle to the respective
part of the volume reads). This contribution traces the instances in which The Battle
for International Law evokes these notions and links some of the book’s themes to a
critical reading of German international law scholarship.
The “legal” and “political” divide
Across the battlefield that is international law, the Global North’s strategy of the
second half of the 20th century stands out: invoking a firm boundary between the
‘legal’ and the ‘political’. The Global South’s claims have consistently been labelled
as ‘political’ and the attempts at reasserting the North’s dominance as strictly ‘legal’.
The concepts of ‘system’, ‘order’, and ‘coherence’ have been crucial elements of the
weaponry that the North has deployed as part of this strategy. It may strike some
international lawyers – especially those trained on the European continent – as odd
to speak of the notions of ‘system’, ‘order’, and ‘coherence’ as conceptual weapons.
These notions constitute the foundations on which their belief in the rationality,
objectivity, and neutrality of international law rests. For lawyers trained in Germany,
Austria, and Switzerland in particular, Systemdenken is just the way we were trained
to think about law. Martti Koskenniemi identified Systemdenken as one of the main
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themes in the German heritage in international legal thought from the 17th century
to the present. Engaging with the notions of ‘system’, ‘coherence’, or ‘order’ as
conceptual weapons in the battle for international law, therefore, means engaging
with the positions of German(-speaking) international legal scholars.
In 1976, i.e. toward the end of the period the volume on The Battle for International
Law covers, the journal ZaöRV dedicated a special issue on the occasion of the 50th
anniversary of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International
Law (MPIL) in Heidelberg to the topic of ‘International Law as Legal Order’. As
Hermann Mosler and Rudolf Bernhardt state in the preface to this special issue,
the topic was a reference to the very first article published in the same journal in
1929. In this inaugural article, Viktor Bruns, the first director of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-
Institut in Berlin, set the academic standard and defined the method that should
guide the newly founded institute. Bruns characterised international law as a legal
order for the community of states, a system of legal principles, institutions, and rules,
which are interconnected and constitute an ordered arrangement. As Felix Lange
pointed out in his account of German international legal scholarship, the method of
systematisation, prevalent both within the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut and the renamed
MPIL, served the purpose of keeping a distance from politics and of focusing on
the practice of international law. Lange portrays the method of systematization
as the alternative to which the members of the Institute resorted who did not
wish to participate in providing legal justifications for Nazi politics. Accordingly,
systematisation was less discredited after World War II and was therefore the means
of choice for the MPIL to regain the international scholarly community’s trust.
It is in this spirit of trying to remain ‘neutral’, of offering ‘legal’ rather than ‘political’
analysis that German international lawyers in the 1950s to 1970s were complicit in
reproducing and upholding the exclusion of the Third World from having a say in
determining what counts as international law.
Take it or leave it – Coherence, system, and the story of statehood in the battle
for international law
The seemingly innocuous description of international law as a legal system played
a crucial role in countering claims of the Third World amidst and immediately after
formal decolonization. In her chapter on ‘Acquired Rights and State Succession’,
Anne Brunner draws attention to one way in which the idea of the systematicity
of international law – the idea that its rules and principles are interconnected
and necessarily form a whole – was employed to counter the claims of the newly
independent states to start their existence with a clean slate regarding obligations
under customary international law. As an example of how international lawyers
deployed this argumentative tactic, Brunner cites D.P. O’Connell, who argued
that “[n]ew states can hardly claim the privileges and faculties of states and yet
repudiate the system from which these derive” and that “a state, when it comes into
existence as a state, does so in a structural context which gains its form from law”.
The cited argument is particularly hypocritical: it reflects the way in which actors in
the Global South often found themselves trapped in the colonial logic of international
law once they engaged in international law arguments to support their claims. As
Sundhya Pahuja has pointed out, the people in the Global South did not exactly
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choose to seek independence from colonial rule in the form of sovereign states.
The juristic monopoly, which international law held before decolonization, meant
that international law provided ‘a structure by which the heterogeneous movements
for decolonisation could be smoothed into a coherent story’, namely the story of
sovereign statehood. Framing the struggle for independence in the language of
sovereignty and statehood was simply the only option available under international
law. O’Connell’s argument therefore reflects a pernicious line of argument, which
may be simplified as follows: You want independence? Fine, we can offer you
independence only as states. You want to have a say in what your obligations are?
Sorry, you should not have chosen to be a state then.
The North as the guardian of ‘proper’ system-building: the battle over
customary international law
The notions of system, order, and coherence played a decisive role in labelling
Third World attempts at reshaping sources doctrine as ‘political’ and opposing
them to purportedly neutral and ‘legal’ arguments, which just happened to preserve
Western dominance. As Jochen von Bernstorff notes in his chapter on ‘The Battle
for Recognition of Wars of National Liberation’, “[m]any Western governments and
international lawyers from the mid-1960s onwards attempted to delegitimize all those
UN organs as ‘politicized’ that – with the new Asian/ African majority – adopted
documents that were not in line with their political agenda”.
Antony Anghie and Bhupinder S. Chimni, in their article on TWAIL methodology –
notoriously excluded from the famous AJIL symposium on methods in international
law – highlighted Third World states’ attempts at formulating a new approach to
sources doctrine. The UN General Assembly was at the heart of this new approach.
The aim was to create a more democratic and participatory international legal
system. As Anghie and Chimni describe it, the attempts “were often defeated by
positivist arguments regarding sources and consent”.
An illustrative example is Christian Tomuschat’s contribution to the 1976 special
issue of the ZaöRV mentioned above. Tomuschat’s contribution is devoted to the
legally binding force of the Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States
(CERDS, UNGA Res 3281 [XXIX]) and of UNGA resolutions in general. Employing
a technique David Kennedy has described as characteristic of ‘mainstream’
international law, Tomuschat frames his position as a ‘reasonable middle ground’
between two extreme positions. On one side of the extremes, Tomuschat situates
the position of international legal scholars from the Third World, including Obed
Asamoah and R.P. Anand, who presented arguments for lowering the threshold
for creating customary law through UNGA resolutions. On the other side of the
extremes, Tomuschat distances himself from what he calls a ‘strictly traditionalist’
conception of the law – without, however, specifying what such strict traditionalism
might entail and how his position differs from it.
Tomuschat arrives at a position situated between these extremes. UNGA
resolutions may be legally binding – or at least exert a kind of authority that compels
international lawyers to consult the resolution – if what the states consented to in
adopting the resolution is supposed to be a systematic compilation of the rules
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covering an area of international law. Systematicity thus acts as the litmus test for
the legal validity of a document. This standard of systematicity requires both the
substance of the document and the process that led to its adoption to fit in with the
body of international rules established before formal decolonization – and therefore
without participation by the Third World.
By adopting this ‘middle ground’ position described above, Tomuschat intends to
halt a ‘virulent’ process of ‘erosion’ (p. 467) and to counter a growing tendency
to ‘politicize’ the debate on the legal status of UNGA resolutions (p. 476). In
describing the role of the Group of 77 (G77) in the UN General Assembly, the tone
of the article shifts and the language is hardly reconcilable with the position of a
purportedly neutral observer. Tomuschat sees the process that led to the adoption
of the CERDS as an illustration of complete domination of the G77 in the General
Assembly (“wie total die Gruppe der 77 die Szenerie beherrscht”, p. 488). The
mere possibility of adopting resolutions in a manner that Tomuschat describes as
‘steamrolling’ precludes, in his opinion, the recognition of the General Assembly as
a legislative body. This steamrolling, in his account, presents a stark contrast to the
cautious (“behutsam”) approach to international law-making, which the International
Law Commission (ILC) displays (p. 449). Tomuschat drives his point home by
invoking the spectre of a tyrannic world government subduing the world using an
overwhelming majority. This, he goes on, would amount to a death sentence for
some states, while the UN would not be able effectively to protect life and limb of
these imperilled states’ populations (p. 489). Note that European lawyers did not
display a similar horror in the face of majority rule when it came to the ILC or the
International Court of Justice (ICJ).
Conclusions for current battles
The examples in this short piece offer a glimpse into how Western international
lawyers have invoked the idea of international law as a coherent legal system
to defer responsibility for their positions on substance to ‘the structure’ or ‘the
system’. These examples are an invitation for European lawyers to question the
idea of Systemdenken as the pinnacle of a detached and unpolitical ‘legal science’.
Reflecting on our own position is a prerequisite for performing the roles of an
international lawyer responsibly amidst current battles.
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